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Copyright Trolling on the Internet 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the Norwegian folktale Three Billy Goats Gruff, three goats seeking to get fat 
on the greener pastures of a distant hillside were stopped at the foot of a bridge by a 
“great ugly troll, with eyes as big as saucers, and a nose as long as a poker.”1  The 
troll allowed the first two goats to pass when they assured him of a larger goat to 
come.  Unfortunately, the troll bit off more than he could chew:  the third goat was 
larger than the troll and not the least bit intimidated.  The goat launched himself at 
the troll and smashed him to bits, providing safe passage for him and his smaller 
companions.  The goats easily reached the field and ate heartily, but not without 
cost:  they soon ate so much that they were “scarce able to walk home again; and if 
the fat hasn’t fallen off them, why they’re still fat.”2 
This ancient folktale provides an apt metaphor for a group of recent copyright 
infringement cases.  A copyright “troll” company called Righthaven became known 
as the first copyright troll when it filed infringement claims against websites and 
bloggers on behalf of newspaper publishers.  At first Righthaven successfully 
overwhelmed its targets, which agreed to pay a small fee to make the lawsuit go 
away.  Once the more formidable adversary of the Electronic Freedom Foundation 
entered the fray, however, Righthaven met a similar fate as that of its Norwegian 
predecessor.  But like the goats which reached their goal only to pay the price of 
never being able to return home, the champions of a free Internet lost an 
opportunity to reaffirm the protections they so ardently seek. 
Part I of this Note traces the ideological origins of Righthaven from trolling 
practices in a sister area of intellectual property law, patent law, to analogous 
practices in copyright.  Part II examines the particular forms of trolling that 
Righthaven employed to protect newspaper articles and the court system’s reaction 
to the company’s practices.  Part III argues that the Righthaven decisions may have 
won the battle against one copyright trolling campaign but leave unresolved 
important issues of jurisdiction, the scope of fair use exemptions to copyright law 
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 1. Peter Christen Absjørnsen & Jorgen Møe, The Three Billy-Goats Gruff, in POPULAR TALES 
FROM THE NORSE 272 (George Webbe Dasent trans., Kessinger Publ’g 2004) (1859). 
 2. Id.  
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on the Internet and the future of the newspaper industry in an increasingly 
competitive digital marketplace.  The Righthaven cases might have brought some 
much needed clarity to a host of important legal and policy questions, but the 
courts’ swift and punitive rebuke of a particularly abusive troll amounted to a 
missed opportunity for development of the law.  Ultimately, the failure of the 
judiciary to provide much needed guidance is two-fold:  copyright holders and 
potential infringers are left with little guidance as to what forms of use of 
copyrighted material on the Internet are appropriate, and the rationale behind 
maintaining certain copyright enforcement regimes and decrying others is left to 
critical rather than judicial interpretation. 
I.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TROLLS 
A.  PATENT TROLLS 
To best appreciate characteristics and methods of copyright trolls, one must 
begin with their older siblings:  patent trolls.  The term patent troll first emerged 
from its metaphoric cave in The Patent’s Video (1994), an educational introduction 
to the patent system.3  The narrator analogizes a patent to a “border” whereby a 
user would need the patent holder’s permission to cross between two pieces of 
information.4  As the video notes, a broader patent (or larger border) increases the 
likelihood of other parties requesting permission to cross, but the specter of wider 
coverage provides an incentive for trolls to hide along the borders only to extract a 
fee from those who wish to cross.5  In other words, the troll is not interested in 
building or maintaining the bridges or even in making the trip across to bring 
pieces of information together; rather, it is interested in lurking in the shadows and 
reaping financial benefits from those who have little choice but to cross. 
There is some debate over the origin of the term “patent troll,” but there exist 
some general consensus as to the behavior it describes.6  The patent troll model 
works as follows:  the troll seeks out opportunities to buy patents on the cheap, 
 
 3. See Labellevue, The Original Patent Troll, YOUTUBE (Jan. 28, 2007), http://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=lOGoZFzHkhs. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Peter Detkin, former general counsel of Intel, typically receives credit for coining the term in 
the late 1990s.  See Joff Wild, The Real Inventors of the Term “Patent Troll” Revealed, INTELL. ASSET 
MGMT. MAG., (Aug. 22, 2008), http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=cff2afd3-c24e-42e5-
aa68-a4b4e7524177.  In an ironic twist, Detkin now serves as managing director of Intellectual 
Ventures, considered one of the largest active patent trolls.  See R.G., Has the Enemy of Patent Trolls 
Become One?, CIO INSIGHT (Dec. 12, 2005), http://www.cioinsight.com/c/a/Trends/Has-the-Enemy-of-
Patent-Trolls-Become-One/. 
Although patent trolling is not the focus of the present inquiry, it is worth noting that patent trolling 
has come to encompass a wide array of “unsavory” patent related behavior.  See, e.g., Erik Sherman, 
Patent Troll Auctions Free Passes from Lawsuits:  Mobile in Its Sights, CBS MONEY WATCH (Apr. 7, 
2011, 5:05 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505124_162-43449830/patent-troll-auctions-free-
passes-from-lawsuits-mobile-in-its-sights/ (reporting on the auction by patent troll Round Rock 
Research of covenants not to sue, rather than the more traditional activity of selling the patents 
themselves). 
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often during bankruptcy auctions or from producers hoping to sell under-utilized 
patents to fund other research projects.7  With full patent ownership in hand, the 
troll seeks out third-party manufacturers and developers that are either using the 
patent without permission or that may need permission to use the patent for future 
projects.  A troll then either threatens or files an infringement suit in the hopes of 
extracting a large settlement figure, to “make a lot of money off a patent that they 
are not practicing and have no intention of practicing and in most cases never 
practiced.”8  In other words, “patent troll” is a derogatory designation for certain 
nonpracticing entities (NPEs) that extract money from innovators without 
developing or using a new invention.  Whether or not trolls contribute to the 
fundamental purpose of patent and copyright law is a highly contested issue.  The 
Constitution empowers Congress to “promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts,” and it is unclear what progress a patent holder makes if she does not develop 
any new invention or improve upon an existing one.9  Patent trolls undoubtedly 
place stresses on the patent system:  license fees extracted by trolls are 
disproportionate to the added value to the alleged infringer’s use of said patent.10  
Furthermore, litigation and policing costs created by troll-brought infringement 
suits raise the costs of manufacturing.11  Less clear, though, is whether all 
components of trolling are necessarily deleterious to the patent field.12  First, it is 
little questioned that patent trolling is an effective mode of revenue generation.13  
 
 7. For bankruptcy auctions, see Michael Kanellos, Patent Auctions:  Lawyer’s Dream or Way of 
the Future?, ZDNET (Mar. 3, 2006, 4:00 AM), http://web.archive.org/web/20070403015832/http:// 
news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-6045371.html; Glenn G. Lammi, Will a New Patent Troll Emerge from 
Nortel IP Auction?, FORBES (Jun. 27, 2011, 11:03 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/docket/2011 
/06/27/will-a-new-patent-troll-emerge-from-nortel-ip-auction.  For patent sale as a cash-generator, see 
Howard Mustoe, Small Tech Companies Sell Patents to Raise Cash, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/14/business/worldbusiness/14iht-patent.4.19365587.html?_r=0; Gene 
Quinn, Kodak Prepares to Sell 10% of Patent Portfolio to Stay Viable, IP WATCHDOG (Nov. 5, 2011, 
1:56 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/11/05/kodak. . .to-sell. . .patent. . ./id=20232/.   
 8. Alan Murray, War on ‘Patent Trolls’ May be Wrong Battle, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2006, at 
A2.  The pressure toward settlement under the threat of litigation is a pervasive phenomenon not 
confined to intellectual property.  See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Law:  The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).   
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property 
Clause:  Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. 
L.J. 1771 (2006).  For more on the costs of patent trolls, see James Bessen et al., The Private and Social 
Costs of Patent Trolls (Boston U. Sch. Law, Working Paper No. 11-45, 2011), available at 
http://www.groklaw.net/pdf3/BessenJFordJMeurerM091911.pdf; Aimee Groth, The Astronomical Cost 
of Patent Trolls:  $500 Billion, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 20, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-
09-20/strategy/30179206_1_patent-reform-patent-system-patent-troll.  
 10. See Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & 
TECH. 1 (2007). 
 11. Kal Raustiala & Chris Sprigman, How “Patent Trolling” Taxes Innovation, FREAKONOMICS 
(Jul. 11, 2011, 2:01 PM), http://www.freakonomics.com/2011/07/11/how-patent-trolling-taxes-
innovation/.  
 12. Sujitha Subramanian, Patent Trolls in Thickets:  Who Is Fishing Under the Bridge?, 30 EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 5, 182–188 (2008) (U.K.) (examining the arguments in favor of patent trolling and 
arguing for a look beyond patent trolls to the underlying problems of the patent system more broadly). 
 13. See Barrie McKenna, Paul Waldie & Simon Avery, Patently Absurd, GLOBE & MAIL (Feb. 
21, 2006), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/incoming/patently-absurd/article1095310/?page=all.  This 
(3) POLONSKY_POST-FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/12  5:55 PM 
74 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [36:1 
Second, whereas nearly all entities deemed trolls are NPEs, one might not portray 
all NPEs such as universities and nonprofit research institutions as patent trolls.14  
Third, the most effective patent trolls often amass an enormous catalog of patents 
in order to cover a wide array of potential development projects.15  Manufacturers 
often benefit from this amassing of patents via access to a one-stop shop rather than 
an endless series of individual gatekeepers each of which can singlehandedly 
bottleneck an entire project.16  Fourth, patent trolls create a secondary market for 
patents, which provides incentive for inventors to create patents and promotes core 
property theories of exchange and alienability.17 
In the patent context, then, there is open debate over how best to handle the 
proliferation of trolling.  Recent court cases have placed limitations on patent 
infringement litigation.18  Additionally, Congress’ passage of the America Invents 
Act may further curb certain troll-like behavior.19  Ultimately, though, patent 
 
can be boiled down to three key factors.  First, patent filings often overlap with one another, providing a 
well armed patent troll ample opportunity to find an infringing or duplicative patent.  Second, even a 
successful patent defense lawsuit can run upwards of $1 million pretrial and $2.8 million for a complete 
defense.  Third, as non-producing entities (NPEs), patent trolls typically lack the incentive to cross-
license potentially overlapping patents between producers so as to avoid crippling litigation costs.  In 
other words, it is often much easier to settle a case for large figures, even though a defendant would 
likely win should the case ever go to court.  See BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AN OVERVIEW 
OF THE “PATENT TROLLS” DEBATE (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42668.pdf.   
 14. Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 611, 612 (2008) (“Universities . . . share some characteristics with trolls, at least if the term is 
broadly defined, but they are not trolls.  . . .  Instead of singling out bad actors, we should focus on the 
bad acts and the laws that make them possible.”). 
 15. See Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Intellectual Ventures:  Revealing Investors, 
PATENTLY-O (May 18, 2011, 12:25 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/05/intellectual-
ventures-revealing-investors.html (“Intellectual Ventures is important because they are now one of the 
Top-Five owners of US Patents. Although the company has played extensive games in an attempt to 
stifle the utility of the patent ownership recording system, it has been reported to hold at least 30,000 
patents.”); Interview with Chief Judge Paul R. Michel on US Patent Reform, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Jul. 
19, 2011, 10:17 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/07/14/interview-with-chief-judge-paul-r-
michel-on-us-patent-reform/. 
 16. See MICHAEL HELLER, GRIDLOCK ECONOMY:  HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS 
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 49–78 (2008); James F. McDonough III, Comment, 
The Myth of the Patent Troll:  An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea 
Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189 (2006).  
 17. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Patents Are Property:  A Fundamental but Important Concept, 4 
J. BUS. & TECH. L. 87, 93 (2009).  Beckerman-Rodau contends that an “inventor’s lack of success often 
reflects an inability to raise adequate capital and a lack of marketing expertise” rather than a deficiency 
in the patent itself.  Id.  Non-NPEs may be better suited to handle the “business” aspects of patent use; 
absent property-based protection, fewer inventors will be willing to developing new patents.  Id. 
 18. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (requiring the 
traditional reasonableness test for imposition of an injunction in a patent infringement lawsuit); Walker 
Digital, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. CV 09-7514 PSG (PJWx), 2011 WL 61618, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 
3, 2011) (holding no literal infringement by Microsoft of Walker Digital’s word browsing technology).  
 19. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, H.R.1249, 112th Cong. (2011).  The patent act does not 
directly address the issue of patent trolls, and two changes to the previous law seem to point in opposite 
directions.  On the one hand, trolls may face difficulty bringing cost effective suits that cover a wide 
number of infringements given the newly heightened joinder requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 299.  See 
Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Rush to Judgment:  New Dis-Joinder Rules and Non-Practicing 
Entities, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 20, 2011, 3:10 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/rush-to-
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holders retain the right to sue for infringement regardless of how a patent is used, 
and patent trolling continues to be tolerated, if not openly embraced.20 
B.  COPYRIGHT TROLLS 
Copyright trolls are in some sense a conceptual outgrowth of patent trolls.  As in 
patent, copyright holders may bring suit for alleged infringement seeking statutory 
damages.21  Both patent and copyright trolls utilize their respective intellectual 
property protections to extract license fees or infringement damages without any 
intention of utilizing the underlying right for other purposes.22  Copyright trolls 
closely follow the patent trolling formula:  own or acquire a broad catalog of 
copyrights, seek out third parties that have infringed said copyrights, and threaten 
or file suit to induce settlement.  Moreover, the financial incentives, while not as 
dramatic as in the patent context, remain potentially substantial.23 
The amassing and asserting rights to copyrighted material by nonauthors is by 
 
judgment-new-dis-joinder-rules-and-non-practicing-entities.html.  But the transition from a first-to-
invent to first-to-file system in 35 U.S.C. § 102 may place added pressure on smaller patent developers 
who cannot afford to file as early in the process, thus making them more vulnerable to trolls seeking to 
purchase said patents inexpensively.  See David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Who Has Priority?  An 
Empirical Exploration of the First to File Rule (drft. 2011), available at http://www.law.depaul.edu 
/centers_institutes/ciplit/ipsc2011/pdf/Papers/AbramsD_Paper.pdf; Dana Rohrabacher, Patent Reform 
Hurts “Little Guy,” POLITICO (Apr. 22, 2011, 4:29 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0411/ 
53564.html.  
 20. Despite its recent loss in its case with Microsoft, Walker Digital continues to file lawsuits 
against large technology companies in the hopes of extracting large sums, either by settlement or in 
court.  See Company Behind Priceline Sues Internet Heavies, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2011, 9:35 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/12/us-walkerdigital-idUSTRE73B38Q20110412.  
 21. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006). 
 22. There are, of course, significant differences among copyright law, patent law and their 
respective trolls.  Fundamentally, patent protects ideas and concepts themselves, whereas copyright 
seeks to protect the forms of their expression.  One can infringe a copyright only if she had access and 
knowledge of the copyrighted work, whereas a patent protects the invention even where the third-party 
inventor was completely unaware of the previous discovery.  See Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing 
Copyright Pirates and Patent Trolls:  The Divergent Evolution of Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 689 (2006) (arguing that technological change brought about in the digital era, and legislative 
efforts to grapple with said change such as the DMCA, has led to a widening gap between patent and 
copyright law). 
 23. See, e.g., Corbis Is Awarded $20M Judgment in the Template Monster Copyright Action, 
PICTURE ARCHIVE COUNCIL AM. (Dec. 4, 2006), http://www.pacaoffice.org/membersOnly/ 
updateArchive/u120406.html (discussing Corbis Corp. v. Lognikov, 1:06-cv-21643 (S.D. Fla. 2006) 
(awarding a stock photo company nearly $20 million damages award against an overseas website 
template company that used copyright protected images without permission)).  Although one may 
distinguish this case from traditional copyright trolls in that the defendant here was a foreign copyright 
pirate, the case is worth noting for the sheer size of potential damages a successful copyright 
infringement case can garner.  The 623 images Lognikov used without authorization would have cost 
less than $1,500 to license, but the statute provided for $30,000 per image and $2,500 per use, allowing 
for upwards of $109 million in damages.  See Dan Heller, Making Money from Your Stolen Images, DAN 
HELLER’S PHOTOGRAPHY BUS. BLOG (Jun. 27, 2007), http://danheller.blogspot.com/2007/06/making-
money-from-your-stolen-images.html; see also Ray Beckerman, Ha Ha Ha Ha Ha.  RIAA Paid Its 
Lawyers More than $16,000,000 in 2008 to Recover Only $391,000!!!, RECORDING INDUSTRY V. THE 
PEOPLE (Jul. 13, 2010), http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2010/07/ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-riaa-
paid-its-lawyers.html.  
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no means a new idea.  In 1842, Harry Wall established the Authors, Composers and 
Artists’ Copyright Office to collect fees for performances of musical works 
protected by British copyright.24  The music publishing industry harshly criticized 
Wall, both for his business tactics and disreputable character.25  Parliament passed 
an act removing the automatic statutory penalty for copyright infringement, instead 
giving the courts discretion to award damages, if any, for unauthorized 
performances.26  Absent the availability of high statutory awards, Wall was left 
without a source of steady income.27  Wall eventually died in prison for unrelated 
crimes, but his vision of broad copyright enforcement as revenue generator came to 
mainstream acceptance in the modern American licensing regime:  the American 
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP).  ASCAP “protects the 
rights of its members by licensing and distributing royalties for the non-dramatic 
public performances of their copyrighted works.”28  Since 1914, ASCAP has and 
continues to represent a very large copyright portfolio (over 420,000 artists), 
extracting a small fee from each third-party use—from barrooms to school 
fundraisers.29 
In stark contrast to ASCAP and its century-long respected enterprise, other 
contemporary entities have faced stronger rebuke and been cast—perhaps 
inappropriately—as copyright trolls.30  For instance, copyright infringement suits in 
the realm of peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing have been a prime focus of the anti-
copyright troll movement.31  A P2P file sharing action involves the copyright 
holder alleging infringement for the unauthorized distribution of protected content 
directly from one computer to another.  In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., the Supreme Court held the provider and marketer of P2P file 
sharing software accountable for third-party copyright infringement utilizing said 
program.32  Subsequent to Grokster, copyright holders in independent and 
 
 24. Isabella Alexander, The Birth of the Performing Right in Britain, in PRIVILEGE AND 
PROPERTY:  ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT 321, 339–46 (Ronan Deazley et al. eds., 2010).  
 25. Id. at 339.  Wall was imprisoned in 1860 for “obtaining property under false pretense.”  Id. 
 26. Id. at 343. 
 27. Id. at 344. 
 28. ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/about/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2011).  
 29. For more on ASCAP, see Meghan Dougherty, Voluntary Collective Licensing:  The Solution 
to the Music Industry’s File Sharing Crisis?, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 405 (2006); Laurence R. Helfer, 
World Music on a U.S. Stage:  A Berne/Trips and Economic Analysis of the Fairness in Music Licensing 
Act, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 93, 95 (2000); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules:  Intellectual 
Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996).  
 30. The term “copyright troll” first began to appear on the Internet in the mid-2000s, mostly to 
describe a certain breed of copyright enforcers.  See Caroline Horton Rockafellow, Copyright Trolls—A 
Different Embodiment of the Patent Troll?, WRAL TECH WIRE (Nov. 22, 2006), 
http://wraltechwire.com/business/tech_wire/biotech/story/1167243/ (“The term ‘Copyright Troll’ has 
begun to appear in online publications and blogs, and it may not be long before it becomes part of the 
mainstream conversation.”). 
 31. See generally FIGHT COPYRIGHT TROLLS, http://fightcopyrighttrolls.com (last visited Dec. 21, 
2011).   
 32. 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005) (“We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of 
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to 
foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”); see also Jacqueline 
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pornographic films initiated lawsuits seeking statutory damages for infringing 
distributions of their protected material.33  The plaintiff in one action, the Adult 
Copyright Company (ACC), sought to join over 22,000 alleged file sharers across a 
host of pornographic titles, a volume-based litigation strategy in keeping with the 
traditional troll model.34  This approach was undermined in form, if not substance, 
when the court required ACC to bring each infringement case separately, creating a 
significant financial burden.35  But the parties bringing such actions are typically 
the creators of the allegedly infringed works, not trolls in the guise of nonproducing 
patent entities or Harry Wall.36 
That courts in these cases relied upon procedural rather than substantive grounds 
to rebuke troll-like activity may be simply a matter of threshold litigation 
requirements.  On the other hand, the avoidance of difficult questions such as the 
appropriate scope of copyright enforcement on the Internet suggests a normative 
judgment about who can access such enforcement mechanisms.  Why are those like 
the ACC who seek to enforce copyright protection in the realm of P2P file sharing 
resoundingly derided as opportunistic trolls, whereas ASCAP, despite its unseemly 
origins, continues to avoid reprobation?  Are the enforcement mechanisms 
significantly different?  Should certain forms of distribution—that is, public 
performance versus Internet-based file sharing—warrant stronger copyright 
protection?  Or is it simply a matter of character (i.e., anti-establishment criminals 
such as Wall, pornographers seeking statutory damages and independent film 
producers versus a member-owned league of mainstream musicians)?  An analysis 
of the rise and fall of Righthaven suggests some possible explanations. 
 
C. Charlesworth, The Moral of the Story:  What Grokster Has to Teach About the DMCA, 2011 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 6 (2011); Kristine Grigorian, MGM v. Grokster:  Adopting Patent Law’s Active 
Inducement Doctrine and Shifting the Focus to Actions of Alleged Indirect Infringers, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. 
L. 127 (2007); Alfred C. Yen, Third-Party Copyright Liability After Grokster, 91 MINN. L. REV. 184 
(2006). 
 33. Fred von Lohmann, New Lawsuits Against Movie Downloaders, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Mar. 30, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/03/50-000-i-new-i-lawsuits-against-
movie-downloaders (“We’re creating a revenue stream and monetizing the equivalent of an alternative 
distribution channel.”); see also Copyright Troll Gives Up in Porn-Downloading Case, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 1, 2011), https://www.eff.org/press/archives/2011/01/31 (“When adult film 
companies launch these cases, there is the added pressure of embarrassment associated with 
pornography, which can convince those ensnared in the suits to quickly pay what’s demanded of them, 
whether or not they have legitimate defenses. That’s why it’s so important to make sure the process is 
fair.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Nate Anderson, Judge Kills Massive P2P Porn Lawsuit, Kneecaps Copyright Troll, 
ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 17, 2010, 10:04 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/12/judge-
kills-massive-p2p-porn-lawsuit-kneecaps-copyright-troll.ars. 
 35. Id. (“If [ACC] wants to proceed against all these people, [it] can do so individually and pay 
the $350 per case filing fee.  (For the cases severed yesterday, this would amount to $1.8 million in 
filing fees alone.”)). 
 36. See, e.g., Sarah Jacobsson Purewal, “Hurt Locker” Lawsuit Targets 24,583 BitTorrent Users, 
PC WORLD (May 24, 2011, 8:07 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/228519/hurt_locker_lawsuit_ 
targets_24583_bittorrent_users.html (describing lawsuit brought against BitTorrent users by the 
legitimate producers of the Academy Award winning film). 
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II.  THE RIGHTHAVEN CASES 
A.  NEWSPAPERS GET “MAD AS HELL” 
Righthaven, LLC has emerged as the first organization to bring copyright 
trolling to the newspaper industry.37  The company first was announced through a 
“manifesto” published by the Las Vegas Review-Journal (LVR-J) entitled 
Copyright Theft:  We’re Not Taking It Anymore.38  The president of LVR-J’s parent 
company Stephens Media referred to Righthaven as a “technology company . . . 
whose only job is to protect copyrighted content.”39  In an arrangement Righthaven 
described as a “grubstake” (a deal in which someone would lend funds or materials 
to a mining prospector in exchange for a share of any profits from excavation), the 
coventure between Stephens Media and Las Vegas attorney Steve Gibson would 
have Righthaven enforce LVR-J copyrights and share the profits from successful 
lawsuits and settlements with Stephens Media.40 
Righthaven rewrote the rules for how to enforce newspaper copyrights.  Rather 
than concern itself with the entire world of alleged infringement, Righthaven 
focused exclusively on Internet-based misappropriations.41  Typically, when a 
newspaper discovered unauthorized use of its material, it would ask for the content 
to be removed and replaced with a link to the newspaper’s own website.42  Should 
its request go unheeded, the paper would likely send a Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) takedown notice to encourage compliance.43  Even when 
 
 37. Steve Green, Legal Attack Dog Sicked on Websites Accused of Violating R-J Copyrights, LAS 
VEGAS SUN (Aug. 4, 2010, 2:00 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/aug/04/unlikely-targets-
emerging-war-media-content/ (“Righthaven lawsuits . . . [are] a waste of judicial resources.”). 
 38. Sherman Frederick, Copyright Theft:  We’re Not Taking It Anymore, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. 
(May 28, 2010, 2:40 PM), http://www.lvrj.com/blogs/sherm/Copyright_theft_Were_not_taking_it_ 
anymore.html?ref=164.  This title presumably emerges from a famous line in the film Network (1976), 
in which disgruntled (if not deranged) newscaster Howard Beale (Peter Finch) proclaims:  “I don’t have 
to tell you things are bad.  Everybody knows things are bad.  It’s a depression.  Everybody’s out of work 
or scared of losing their job. . . .  So I want you to get up now. I want all of you to get up out of your 
chairs.  I want you to get up right now and go to the window.  Open it, and stick your head out, and yell, 
‘I’M AS MAD AS HELL, AND I’M NOT GOING TO TAKE THIS ANYMORE!’”  
 39. Frederick, supra note 38. 
 40. David Kravets, Newspaper Chain’s New Business Plan:  Copyright Suits, WIRED (Jul. 22, 
2010, 3:29 PM) [hereinafter Kravets, Newspaper Chain’s New Business Plan], http://www.wired.com/ 
threatlevel/2010/07/copyright-trolling-for-dollars/.   
 41. From a practical standpoint, this makes a good deal of sense:  rather than having to employ 
individuals nationwide to track instances of alleged infringement, a simple Google Alert for the 
newspaper’s name, the author or keywords would turn up far-flung uses in an instant.  See Jonathan 
Bailey, Tips for Using Google Alerts, PLAGIARISM TODAY (Nov. 7, 2005), http://www.plagiarismtoday. 
com/2005/11/07/tips-for-using-google-alerts/ (“[Google Alerts] enables Webmasters, even those with 
large volumes of content, to search for new instances of their work daily and be notified when copies of 
their material, both legal and illegal ones, are posted online.”). 
 42. Is it “Fair” to Link to News Articles?, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 15, 2010), http:// 
www.natlawreview.com/article/it-fair-to-link-to-news-articles (“Righthaven then sues the blog owner, 
without sending a standard ‘cease and desist’ letter, for copyright infringement.”). 
 43. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).  For 
discussion of the distinct treatment of user-generated and Web-hosted content under the DMCA, see 
Michael S. Sawyer, Filters, Fair Use & Feedback:  User-Generated Content Principles and the DMCA, 
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notice proved ineffective, the high costs of litigation—both financial and public 
relations-wise—have led to few cases being brought.44 
Righthaven, by contrast, took a far more aggressive stance.  Shortly after 
discovering an unauthorized use of newspaper content on websites and blogs 
“ranging from those that report marijuana news to sports betting sites,” Righthaven 
immediately filed papers in court seeking upwards of $75,000 in statutory 
damages.45  Such a wide-net campaign was certainly not new.  Several years prior 
to the emergence of Righthaven, the Recording Industry of America (RIAA) took a 
similar stance when enforcing copyright against any and all infringers during its 
anti-file-sharing campaign; however, the scorched earth policy of suing all users 
garnered significant negative publicity, badly damaging the image of otherwise 
legitimate copyright holders seeking to protect against infringement.46  In seeming 
ignorance of the lessons of recent history, Righthaven brazenly sued the smallest of 
website operations.47  To make matters worse, Righthaven sought remedy above 
and beyond damages for unauthorized use, requesting seizure of the infringing 
website’s domain name, as well.  Though domain name seizure was an 
unprecedented remedy (and one that at least one court would later reject), even a 
remote possibility of losing one’s website significantly raised the stakes for the 
Righthaven defendants that chose not to settle quickly.48 
 
24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 363 (2009). 
 44. A rare example of a non-Righthaven newspaper claim being brought is The Associated Press 
v. All Headline News Corp., 608 F. Supp. 2d 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).   
 45. Frederick, supra note 38. 
 46. See Derek Evers, RIAA Wins $8K Default Settlement Against Chronically Ill Teen, FADER 
(Dec. 5, 2008, 7:25 PM), http://www.thefader.com/2008/12/05/riaa-wins-8k-default-setlement-against-
chronically-ill-teen/#ixzz1hGkPVFqS; Robert Scott Lawrence, The RIAA Will Sue Your Grandma, WHO 
IS YOUR LAWYER? (May 28, 2010), http://www.whoisyourlawyer.com/sue-grandma/.  Following this 
bad publicity, RIAA infringement suits dropped significantly beginning in 2009.  See David Kravets, 
Copyright Lawsuits Plummet in Aftermath of RIAA Campaign, WIRED (May 18, 2010, 1:24 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/05/riaa-bump/.  
 47. See Righthaven, LLC v. JAMA, 2:10-CV-1322 JCM LRL, 2011 WL 1541613, at *1 (D. Nev. 
Apr. 22, 2011) (alleging infringement by the Center for Intercultural Organizing, an Oregon-based 
nonprofit “dedicated to helping immigrants become aware of immigration-related issues in the United 
States”); Righthaven LLC v. Hill, No. 1:11-CV-00211-JLK, 2011 WL 4018105, at *1 (D. Colo. January 
27, 2011) (alleging infringement by the blog of Mr. Hill, “who suffers from autism and diabetes and 
lives on disability checks with his mother,” Dan Frosch, Enforcing Copyrights Online, For a Profit, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/business/media/03righthaven.html? 
_r=1&pagewanted=all); Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Righthaven LLC v. Wong, No. 10-cv-
00856 (D. Nev. June 4, 2010) (alleging infringement on the site “City Feline Blog,” written from the 
perspective of a cat); see also Eric E. Johnson, Purr-loined Story Gets Cat Blog Sued, BLOG L. BLOG 
(June 8, 2010, 9:18 AM), http://bloglawblog.com/blog/?p=408. 
 48. See Richard Esguerra, Righthaven’s Brand of Copyright Trolling, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Sept. 2, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/09/righthavens-own-brand-copyright-
trolling (“Effectively asking for control of all of a website’s existing and future content—instead of only 
targeting the allegedly infringing material—is an overreaching remedy for a single copyright 
infringement not validated by copyright law or any legal precedent.  This also indicates that the 
attorneys are willing to make overreaching claims in order to scare defendants into a fast settlement.”).  
In Righthaven, LLC v. DiBiase, the court dismissed the domain name seizure request as a remedy 
outside those prescribed by Congress.  No. 2:10-CV-01343-RLH, 2011 WL 1458778, at *2 (D. Nev. 
Apr. 15, 2011).  But as Esguerra notes, much of the damage lies in the threat.  Esguerra, supra. 
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The initial reaction to Righthaven in certain circles was overwhelmingly critical.  
The blogosphere thrives on open and free exchange of information on the Internet; 
when Righthaven set its sights on this vocal interest group the negative response 
came immediately.49  Wired magazine described Righthaven as “borrowing a page 
from the patent trolls,” and a wave of name-calling—from “McDonald’s coffee 
cases of copyright litigation” to “thugster stooge”—followed.50  In addition, several 
sites described how to circumvent Righthaven’s efforts to snag copyright 
infringers.51  Nevertheless, Righthaven maintained its approach throughout the 
summer of 2010, and it brought on additional newspaper clients from Arkansas to 
Colorado.52 
B.  THE RISE AND FALL OF RIGHTHAVEN 
1.  Initial Success 
Righthaven’s “sue to settle” campaign was initially quite successful.  Of the 276 
cases Righthaven filed, over half settled almost immediately after claims were 
brought, totaling approximately $352,500 in awards.53  Of the approximately 
twelve Righthaven cases that reached district court rulings prior to June 2011, only 
 
 49. An unbiased assessment of the “public response” to Righthaven suffers from the scarcity of 
critical opinion outside interest groups such as independent bloggers and tech-focused industry types.   
 50. Green, supra note 37; Eric E. Johnson, Righthaven’s Innovation? Stooping Lower, BLOG L. 
BLOG (Aug. 10, 2010, 11:32 PM), http://bloglawblog.com/blog/?p=940; Kravets, Newspaper Chain’s 
New Business Plan, supra note 40.   
 51. See Clayton Cramer, How to Make Sure You Don’t Accidentally Visit Organizations that 
Don’t Want You, CLAYTON CRAMER’S BLOG (Aug, 18, 2010, 7:55 PM), http://claytonecramer.blogspot. 
com/2010/08/how-to-make-you-dont-accidental-visit.html (providing instructions to install a web-
browser application to block all Stephens Media-owned websites); Ryan Gile, Avoiding the Wrath of 
Righthaven, LAS VEGAS TRADEMARK ATT’Y (Aug. 6, 2010, 6:03 AM), http://www. 
vegastrademarkattorney.com/2010/08/avoiding-wrath-of-righthaven.html (“While there is nothing 
clearly outlined on the RJ’s own website, Mark Hinueber, the Vice President and General Counsel for 
Stephens Media, recently provided some guidance for third parties regarding how to properly cite 
review journal articles.”); David Kravets, The $105 Fix That Could Protect You From Copyright-Troll 
Lawsuits, WIRED (Oct. 27, 2010, 1:54 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/10/dmca-
righthaven-loophole/ (“‘The DMCA is a good deterrent from being sued,’ says Kurt Opsahl, a staff 
attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation, ‘Complying with conditions of eligibility for the safe 
harbor is a good thing to do.  It probably will prevent somebody from suing you in the first place.’ . . .  If 
you run a U.S. blog or a community site that accepts user content, you can register a DMCA agent by 
downloading this form (.pdf) and sending $105 and the form to Copyright RRP, Box 71537, 
Washington, D.C., 20024.”).   
 52. Denver Post Working with Vegas Firm to Sue Alleged Infringers, L. WK. COLO. (Dec. 10, 
2010), http://www.lawweekonline.com/2010/12/denver-post-working-with-vegas-firm-to-sue-alleged-
infringers/; Wendy Davis, Report:  Arkansas Democrat-Gazette Owner Taps Righthaven for Copyright 
Enforcement, DAILY ONLINE EXAMINER (Aug. 31, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://www.mediapost.com/ 
publications/article/134780/. 
 53. RIGHTHAVEN LAWSUITS, http://www.righthavenlawsuits.com/index.html (last updated Oct. 
25, 2012).  Righthaven Lawsuits provides a thorough index of cases filed and articles posted involving 
Righthaven.  The site calculates the $352,500 figure based upon an “educated guesstimate of an average 
of $2,500 settled per case.”  Id. 
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two were dismissed.54  Two of the surviving cases involved miscellaneous 
procedural issues.55  Others overcame jurisdictional attacks:  in Righthaven, LLC v. 
Majorwager.com, the court held personal jurisdiction over Righthaven because “it 
is common knowledge that the [LVR-J] is published and distributed in Las Vegas, 
NV,” the unlicensed use “arose from the local publication of the article in the state 
of Nevada,” and exercise of jurisdiction, despite some hardship to out-of-state 
defendants, was reasonable.56  Courts also held that Righthaven had standing to 
bring its cases.  In keeping with the Ninth Circuit’s prior holding that assignees of 
both the copyright to a work and any accrued infringement actions could bring a 
claim for infringements that occurred preassignment, Stephens Media had granted 
Righthaven both a right to sue and the “exclusive copyright assignment itself.”57 
Finally, four cases looked past the jurisdictional requirements to delve, however 
briefly, into substantive analysis.58  Here courts looked to whether the use of 
newspaper content by third-party websites, while admittedly unauthorized, was 
nevertheless protected.  While two of these cases found the defendant’s use to be 
fair,59 the court in one instance declined to grant a fair use defense at the summary 
judgment stage, finding the majority of fair use analysis factors to contain 
“disputed issue[s] of material fact that [are] more properly resolved at trial.”60  In 
one additional case, Righthaven, LLC v. DiBiase, the court did not rule on the 
merits of the case, but it rejected Righthaven’s request for transfer of the 
defendant’s domain name as beyond the scope of remedies authorized by 
Congress.61  Courts thus addressed the substantive merits of Righthaven’s 
 
 54. See Righthaven, LLC v. JAMA, No. 2:10-CV-1322 JCM LRL, 2011 WL 1541613, at *5 (D. 
Nev. Apr. 22, 2011) (finding non-profit center’s Web posting of an LVR-J article in its entirety protected 
as fair use); Righthaven LLC v. Realty One Group, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-1036-LRH-PAL, 2010 WL 
4115413, at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 19, 2010) (finding blog posting of a LVR-J article excerpt protected as fair 
use).  
 55. Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground, LLC, 2:10-CV-1356-RLH-GWF, 2011 WL 
1457743, at *3 (D. Nev. Apr. 14, 2011) (granting defendant’s request to unseal documents); Righthaven 
LLC v. Klerks, No. 2:10-CV-00741-GMN-LRL, 2010 WL 3724897, at *5 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2010) 
(granting defendant’s motion to set aside default judgment).  
 56. Righthaven, LLC v. Majorwager.com, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-00484-GMN, 2010 WL 4386499, at 
*3–4 (D. Nev. Oct. 28, 2010) (internal citation omitted); see also Righthaven, LLC v. Vote for the 
Worst, LLC, 2:10-CV-01045-KJD, 2011 WL 1304463 (D. Nev. Mar. 30, 2011); Righthaven, LLC v. 
Mostofi, 2:10-CV-01066-KJD-GWF, 2011 WL 1098971 (D. Nev. Mar. 22, 2011); Righthaven, LLC v. 
S. Coast Partners, Inc., 2:10-CV-01062-LRH-LRL, 2011 WL 534046 (D. Nev. Feb. 8, 2011); 
Righthaven, LLC v. Indus. Wind Action Corp., No. 210-CV-00601-RLH-PAL, 2010 WL 3829411 (D. 
Nev. Sept. 24, 2010); Righthaven LLC v. Dr. Shezad Malik Law Firm P.C., No. 2:10-CV-0636-RLH-
RJJ, 2010 WL 3522372 (D. Nev. Sept. 2, 2010). 
 57. Shezad Malik, 2010 WL 3522372, at *2 (citing Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 
881, 889 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also Vote for the Worst, 2011 WL 1304463, at *1–2; Majorwager.com, 
2010 WL 4386499, at *1–2.  For more on Silvers, see infra Part II(B)(2)(a). 
 58. Righthaven LLC v. Choudhry, 2:10-CV-2155 JCM PAL, 2011 WL 1743839 (D. Nev. May 3, 
2011), reconsideration denied, 2:10-CV-2155 JCM PAL, 2011 WL 2976800 (D. Nev. July 21, 2011); 
JAMA, 2011 WL 1541613; Righthaven, LLC v. DiBiase, 2:10-CV-01343-RLH, 2011 WL 1458778 (D. 
Nev. Apr. 15, 2011); Realty One Group, Inc., 2010 WL 4115413. 
 59. JAMA, 2011 WL 1541613; Realty One Group, Inc., 2010 WL 4115413. 
 60. Choudhry, 2011 WL 1743839, at *4. 
 61. DiBiase, 2011 WL 1458778, at *2 (“Congress has never expressly granted plaintiffs in 
copyright infringement cases the right to seize control over the defendant’s website domain.”). 
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individual cases, and had begun to define the contours of what constituted a viable 
claim and what remedies might be available. 
2.  Democratic Underground:  Beginning of the End 
Any hope of merits-based, case-by-case analysis ended with Righthaven LLC v. 
Democratic Underground, LLC.62  Righthaven sued Democratic Underground 
(DU), a progressive website host of “discussion forums,” which had posted an 
excerpt from an LVR-J article on the Tea Party and Nevada senatorial candidate 
Sharron Angle.63  DU brought on the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), “an 
influential freedom of speech and online privacy advocate,” to help defend the 
case.64  Undeterred by Righthaven’s bullying tactics, DU went on the offensive, 
referring to the troll as a “sham representative” seeking to “extract nuisance 
settlements.”65  In response, Righthaven sought to dismiss the suit voluntarily, on 
condition that it would not be responsible for any counterclaim for attorney’s 
fees.66  DU opposed Righthaven’s condition, and it instead sought summary 
judgment on the merits.67 
On June 14, 2011, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada issued a 
summary judgment ruling, not on any substantive examination of the alleged 
infringement at issue but on the procedural ground of subject matter jurisdiction.  
The early cases’ discussion of subject matter jurisdiction addressed whether 
previously accrued causes of action were assignable, not validity of the copyright 
assignment itself.68  Democratic Underground marked a fundamental shift into 
substantive consideration of who held standing to bring suit through a direct 
 
 62. 791 F. Supp. 2d 968 (D. Nev. 2011). 
 63. Democratic Underground, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 971; About Democratic Underground, 
DEMOCRATIC UNDERGROUND, http://www.democraticunderground.com/about.html (last visited Dec. 
26, 2011). 
 64. Steve Green, Defendants Fight Back Against Righthaven Copyright Lawsuits, LAS VEGAS 
SUN (Sept. 20, 2010, 1:50 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/sep/20/defendants-fight-back-
against-righthaven-copyright/.  
 65. Answer of Defendants Democratic Underground, LLC and David Allen and Counterclaim of 
Counterclaimant Democratic Underground, LLC at 6, Democratic Underground, 791 F. Supp. 2d (No. 
2:10-CV-01356-RLH-RJJ).  
 66. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant’s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Counterclaim and [Proposed] 
Order of Dismissal at 3, Democratic Underground, 791 F. Supp. 2d 968 (No. 2:10-cv-01356-RLH-
RHH), available at https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/righthaven_v_dem/Plaintiff_ 
VoluntaryDismissal.pdf.  While perhaps surprising in light of its previous tactics, Righthaven might 
have backed down here for having met its match. 
 67. Consolidated Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal to the Extent 
it Seeks to Foreclose Award of Attorney’s Fees, and in Support of Cross-motion for Summary Judgment 
at 17–23, Democratic Underground, 791 F. Supp.2d 968 (No. 2:10-cv-01356-RLH(RJJ)), available at 
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/righthaven_v_dem/PlfMSJ.pdf. 
 68. See Righthaven, LLC v. Dr. Shezad Malik Law Firm P.C., No. 2:10-cv-0636-RLH-RJJ, 2010 
WL 3522372, at *2 (D. Nev. Sept. 2, 2010) (citing Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 
889 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also Righthaven, LLC v. Majorwager.com, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-00484-GMN-
LRL, 2010 WL 4386499, at *1–2 (D. Nev. Oct. 28, 2010); Righthaven, LLC v. Vote for the Worst, 
LLC, No. 2:10-CV-01045-KJD-GWF, 2011 WL 1304463, at *1–2 (D. Nev. Mar. 30, 2011).  For a 
detailed discussion of Silvers and its impact on the Righthaven cases, see infra Part II(B)(2)(a). 
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examination of the arrangement between Righthaven and the LVR-J.  Subject 
matter jurisdiction proved pivotal to the Righthaven cases, for the court’s finding 
that Righthaven lacked standing to bring suit for copyright infringement effectively 
halted Righthaven in its tracks.69  It is important, then, to understand existing 
precedent on the issue that determined the ultimate result. 
a.  The State of Copyright Standing Prior to Democratic Underground 
The Democratic Underground court based its decision on the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc.70  There, the writer of an 
original made-for-TV screenplay did not hold the copyright (her script was a 
“work-for-hire” and thus the copyright was in the name of the production 
company), but she was assigned the right to sue a motion picture production 
company for infringing her script in a subsequent film production.71  In response to 
the writer’s infringement complaint, the motion picture company moved to dismiss 
for lack of standing “in the absence of some legal or beneficial ownership in the 
underlying copyright” by the writer.72  The Silvers court held that a “bare 
assignment of an accrued cause of action is impermissible” under the Copyright 
Act, wherein an assignee must possess some additional right to maintain a claim.73  
Copyright, the court noted, “is a creature of statute,” whereby Congress establishes 
the parameters of authors’ protection.74  The court looked to section 501(b) of the 
1976 Copyright Act, in which “the legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right 
under a copyright is entitled . . . to institute an action for any infringement.”75  The 
1976 Act lists six types of exclusive rights in section 106, none of which includes 
an assignment of the right to sue for an accrued cause of action;76 under the 
doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, reasoned the court, a potential 
plaintiff must possess one of these “exclusive rights” to maintain a claim for 
copyright infringement.77 
The Silvers court recognized that section 501(b) did not explicitly address the 
ability of non-exclusive rights holders to bring an infringement claim, so it instead 
looked to the legislative history, analogous intellectual property treatment in the 
patent law context and other circuit decisions to support its interpretation.  
According to the court’s reading of the legislative history, the mention of “owners 
of particular right” who may sue, and “other owners” who must be notified, absent 
any notice requirement for nonowners, “suggests that Congress did not envision 
their existence, or that the right to sue was a right severable from ownership of one 
 
 69. Righthaven, LLC v. Democratic Underground, LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 968, 976 (D. Nev. 
2011). 
 70. 402 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 71. Id. at 883. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 890. 
 74. Id. at 883.  
 75. Id. at 884 (internal citation omitted).   
 76. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 77. 402 F.3d at 885.   
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of the authorized exclusive rights.”78  Additionally, the court drew a comparison 
between copyright and patent law; in Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & 
Machine Works, the Supreme Court required that the assignee of a right to sue for 
patent infringement must also have ownership of the patent itself.79  Patent rights, 
like copyright, are “created by the act of Congress,” and Congress has provided no 
such right to sue absent ownership of the patent.80  Buttressed by the “historic 
kinship between patent law and copyright law,” the Silvers court used the same 
reasoning as the Supreme Court in Crown Die.81  Finally, the court looked to 
existing precedent beyond the Ninth Circuit.  In Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 
the Fifth Circuit held that assigning the author of a work the right to sue was 
enough to meet the standing requirement.82  The Silvers court distinguished this 
decision on two grounds:  first, Prather was decided under the 1909 Act, which, 
unlike the 1976 Act, did not define “proprietor” or “exclusive rights” necessary to 
sue for infringement; second, Neva Paperbacks included an assignment of the 
copyright with the assigned right to sue for accrued infringements, thus not 
addressing the situation of Silvers in which the possessor of the accrued cause of 
action and the exclusive copyright holder “are two different people.”83  Instead, 
Silvers adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee 
Undergarment Co., which barred those who do not hold an exclusive right in a 
copyright from suing for infringement.84  There was some question as to whether or 
not Eden Toys involved an accrued or potential future cause of action, but a 
subsequent Second Circuit holding made clear that accrued causes of action were 
acceptable, so long as an exclusive right in the copyright was transferred as well.85  
Thus, the Silvers court dismissed the suit for lack of standing.86 
The decision in Silvers has been met with harsh criticism, both on the bench and 
in academic circles.87  These arguments can be broken down into five categories. 
First, critics contend that the Silvers majority misinterpreted the terms of section 
501(b) the statute.  As noted above, the majority in Silvers relied upon the mention 
of “exclusive rights holders” in section 501(b) to preclude any party that does not 
fit within one of the exclusive rights specified in section 106.88  But section 501(b) 
also contains a durational limitation—a right to “institute an action for any 
infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it”—
 
 78. Id. at 886 (internal citations omitted). 
 79. 261 U.S. 24, 26, 33–35 (1923).  
 80. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 887–88 (citing Crown Die, 261 U.S. at 40). 
 81. Id. at 887, 888.   
 82. 410 F.2d 698, 699 (5th Cir. 1969).   
 83. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 899.   
 84. 697 F.2d 27, 32 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982) (“We do not believe that the Copyright Act permits holders 
of rights under copyrights to choose third parties to bring suits on their behalf.  While F.R. Civ. P. 17(a) 
ordinarily permits the real party in interest to ratify a suit brought by another party, the Copyright Law is 
quite specific in stating that only the ‘owner of an exclusive right under a copyright’ may bring suit.”). 
 85. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrissongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971, 980 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 86. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 890. 
 87. The en banc decision in Silvers came down 7-4, with two separate dissenting opinions from 
Circuit Judge Berzon and Circuit Judge Bea.  See id. at 890–95, 895–911. 
 88. Id. at 885.  
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that is not so strictly upheld, for parties may acquire accrued causes of action for 
infringement that occurred prior to ownership of the copyright.89  If the durational 
limitation is not so strictly held, Judge Berzon argued in dissent, neither should the 
language regarding a holder of an exclusive right.90 
Second, both the dissenting opinions and academic critics argue that the Silvers 
court either mischaracterized or ignored the policy goals of the Constitution and 
1976 Act; namely, the 1976 Act sought to provide for greater divisibility and free 
alienability of copyright, which the Silvers majority unjustifiably circumscribes.91 
Third, the dissenting judges felt that the “kinship” analogy between copyright 
law and patent law was significantly overstated.92  As critics further contend, 
although both rights emerge from the same constitutional provision, the treatment 
of divisibility, standing, and the scope and forms of protection that copyright and 
patent provide contain significant enough differences that the court overstated the 
relevance of a patent case such as Crown & Die to Silvers.93 
 
 89. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2006). 
 90. See Silvers, 402 F.3d at 891 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (arguing that the ability to transfer an 
accrued cause of action “cannot be squared with a literal reading of section 501(b),” which includes a 
durational limitation of entitlement to sue, suggests that the language of 501(b) neither determines the 
durational nor the exclusive right limitation); see also id. at 898 (Bea, J., dissenting) (citing to a portion 
of the legislative history omitted by the majority opinion for the proposition that the 1976 Act was an 
“enlargement of infringement action rights” to include owners of exclusive rights in addition to the pre-
existing and continuing right of the “proprietor” of the original copyright to bring an action under the 
1909 Copyright Act).  In other words, the court’s interpretation of section 501(b), if logically extended, 
would lead to “absurd results.”  Id. at 901 (Bea, J., dissenting); Wenjie Li, Standing to Sue in Another’s 
Shoes:  Can an Assignee of an Accrued Copyright Infringement Claim with No Other Interest in the 
Copyright Itself Sue for the Infringement?, 28 PACE L. REV. 73, 87 (2007); Heather Sanborn, Assigning 
Infringement Claims:  Silvers v. Sony Pictures, 59 ME. L. REV. 439, 453–54 (2007). 
 91. See Silvers, 402 F.3d at 893–94 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted) (using 
“policy-based analyses” similar to those applied to other federal statutes such as ERISA to find the 
assignment of an accrued claim to the creator of the work to not violate Constitutional and statutory 
copyright principles of protecting creators of works and the “need for free alienability and divisibility of 
copyright”); id. at 905 (Bea, J., dissenting) (“[T]he notion that an aftermarket in accrued causes of action 
for copyright infringement is to be prohibited is at best passé and at worst an unwarranted restraint on 
alienation.”); id. at 907 (Bea, J., dissenting) (“Nor indeed is there a reasoned policy consideration given 
for prohibiting suit upon an accrued cause of action for infringement.”); see also Sanborn, supra note 
90, at 456 (“[F]ree assignability of infringement claims would likely increase the value of the 
copyrighted works.”); Karen A. Skretkowicz, Unauthorized Annexing of an Artist’s World:  An 
Argument for Creator-Assignee Standing to Sue for Copyright Infringement, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
437, 467–71 (2007) (“Allowing a Creator-Assignee Standing to Sue Advances Constitutional Goals”). 
 92. See Silvers, 402 F.3d at 894–95 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (“The differences between copyright 
and patent law, and between the nature of the assignment in Crown Die and this case, are significant 
enough to warrant a different result.”); id. at 905 (Bea, C.J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted) 
(drawing distinction between patent and copyright law along different treatments of divisibility, 
different regulatory mechanisms to prevent fraud, and previous court decisions to “exercise the caution 
which we have expressed in the past in applying doctrine formulated in one area to the other”). 
 93. See Alice Haemmerli, Why Doctrine Matters:  Patent and Copyright Licensing and the 
Meaning of Ownership in Federal Context, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 4 (2006) (arguing that 
longstanding confusion between copyright and patent licenses and the ability to transfer ownership is 
“becoming dysfunctional in view of the significance of the economic activity that intellectual property 
licensing represents”); Li, supra note 90, at 90–93 (noting the significant differences between patent and 
copyright with respect to standing, particularly treatments of divisibility and the lower risk of copyright 
invalidation than patent invalidation through the litigation process).   
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Fourth, Judge Bea felt that the court misinterpreted extra-jurisdictional 
precedent:  the Fifth Circuit’s Prather decision involved a licensee, not an 
exclusive rights holder, due to the limitation on divisibility under the 1909 Act that 
was no longer present under the 1976 Act, while the plaintiff’s ownership of an 
exclusive copyright in the Second Circuit’s Eden Toys was not determinative of 
standing but merely “coincidental” to the accrued cause of action.94 
Fifth, Heather Sanborn notes that the exclusive focus on the statutory language 
improperly displaced relevant common law influences, such as alienability of 
choses, given the statutory uncertainty of the 1976 Act and indeterminate judicial 
opinions on the matter of copyright standing.95 
By way of summary, the Silvers court could have instead adopted the Prather 
reasoning, recognized assigned causes of action as sufficient to bring a copyright 
infringement claim, or at least provided an exception to original creators who, for 
one reason or another, lacked copyright in and to their work at the time of the 
alleged infringement. 
b.  Application of Silvers in Democratic Underground 
Regardless of Silvers’ shortcomings, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Nevada had little choice but to apply its approach to the question of Righthaven’s 
standing.  In postmotion briefings in Democratic Underground, Righthaven for the 
first time disclosed the Strategic Alliance Agreement (“SAA”), an agreement 
Stephens Media and Righthaven entered into on January 18, 2010—prior to any 
assignment of individual accrued copyright infringement cases—that “explains the 
rights and responsibilities of each party, and limits and defines future copyright 
assignments between them.”96  The key language appears in Section 7.2 of the 
SAA, whereby: 
Despite any such Copyright Assignment, Stephens Media shall retain (and is hereby 
granted by Righthaven) an exclusive license to Exploit the Stephens Media Assigned 
 
 94.  See Silvers, 402 F.3d at 907 (Bea, J., dissenting) (arguing that Prather stood for the 
proposition that the assignment of an accrued right to sue was proper whether involving “the proprietor 
or not,” and in any event Prather was not an exclusive rights holder but a licensee, as the 1909 Act did 
not allow for the division of copyright between and author and publisher); id. at 909 (Bea, J., dissenting) 
(arguing Eden Toys only limits a third party from suing where exclusive holder chooses not to sue); id. 
at 911 (Bea, J., dissenting) (“[O]wnership of both the copyright and the accrued causes of action was 
merely coincident—not required—for ABKCO to have standing to sue.”). 
 95.  See Sanborn, supra note 90, at 452 (“An assertion that common law never applies in a 
copyright context also proves far too much.”); Bryanne J. Schmitt, Is an Accrued Cause of Action for 
Copyright Infringement More Like a Kidney or a Contract?, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 417, 422, 
454–60 (2007) (arguing that that neither statutory language nor case law answers the standing question, 
and courts should instead look to “alienability of choses in action at common law” as discussed in the 
legislative history of 1976 Act; the determining factor, in other words, should be whether the work is 
inherently personal in nature, and where this is not the case, the divisibility of copyright law supports 
standing where there is transfer of enforcement rights to an accrued infringement absent any additional, 
exclusive rights in and to the copyright). 
 96.  Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground, LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972 (D. Nev. 
2011).   
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Copyrights for any lawful purpose whatsoever and Righthaven shall have no right or 
license to Exploit or participate in the receipt of royalties from the Exploitation of the 
Stephens Media Assigned Copyrights other than the right to proceeds in association 
with  a Recovery.  To the extent that Righthaven’s maintenance of rights to pursue 
infringers of  the Stephens Media Assigned Copyrights in any manner would be 
deemed to diminish  Stephens Media’s right to Exploit the Stephens Media Assigned 
Copyrights, Righthaven  hereby granted an exclusive right to Stephens Media to the 
greatest extent permitted by  law so that Stephens Media shall have unfettered and 
exclusive ability to Exploit the  Stephens Media Assigned Copyrights.  Righthaven 
shall have no Obligation to protect or enforce a Work of Stephens Media that is not 
Stephens Media Assigned Copyrights.97 
Stephens Media, in other words, only granted rights to a portion of sums 
recovered under the infringement actions.  Although the individual transfers of 
accrued causes of action appeared to include a transfer of the underlying copyright, 
the overarching SAA explicitly retained all such exclusive rights to the newspaper 
entity.  Absent more than the right to sue for accrued causes of action, Righthaven 
lacked standing to bring a claim of copyright infringement in violation of the 1976 
Copyright Act.  Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in favor of 
DU.98 
3.  Righthaven’s Decline and New Jurisdictional Analysis 
Democratic Underground ushered in a wave of Righthaven dismissals for lack 
of standing.99  The SAA effectively put a halt to all other legal considerations, and 
nearly all of the subsequent court decisions took up the Democratic Underground 
reasoning.100  Righthaven made efforts to amend the SAA to overcome the 
 
 97. Strategic Alliance Agreement at 4, Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground, LLC, 791 
F. Supp. 2d 968 (D. Nev. 2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/53175589/Strategic-Alliance-
Agreement-Between-Righthaven-and-Stephens-Media; see also id. at 2 (retaining Stephens Media’s 
right of veto power over any infringement action that Righthaven wishes to pursue).   
 98. Righthaven’s lack of standing led to dismissal of its suits but also afforded it protection from 
counterclaims of declaratory judgment of noninfringement.  See Righthaven LLC v. Barham, 2:10-CV-
02150-RLH PAL, 2011 WL 2473602 (D. Nev. June 22, 2011); Righthaven LLC v. DiBiase, 2:10-CV-
01343-RLH PAL, 2011 WL 2473531 (D. Nev. June 22, 2011).  For such actions to proceed, Righthaven 
defendants joined Stephens Media to the cases.  See, e.g., Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground, 
LLC, 2:10-CV-01356-RLH GWF, 2011 WL 3705060 (D. Nev. Aug. 24, 2011). 
 99. Steve Green, Sixth Judge Rules Against Righthaven, VEGAS INC (Nov. 6, 2011, 10:50 AM), 
http://www.vegasinc.com/news/2011/nov/06/sixth-judge-rules-against-righthaven/.   
 100. See Righthaven LLC v. Newsblaze LLC, 2:11-CV-720-RCJ-GWF, 2011 WL 5373785 (D. 
Nev. Nov. 4, 2011); Righthaven LLC v. Inform Techs., Inc., 2:11-CV-00053-KJD LRL, 2011 WL 
4904431 (D. Nev. Oct. 14, 2011); Righthaven LLC v. Hyatt, 2:10-CV-01736-KJD RJJ, 2011 WL 
3652532 (D. Nev. Aug. 19, 2011); Righthaven LLC v. Mostofi, 2:10-CV-1066-KJD-GWF, 2011 WL 
2746315 (D. Nev. July 13, 2011); Barham, 2011 WL 2473602; DiBiase, 2011 WL 2473531; Righthaven 
LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1144–47 (D. Nev. 2011).  Some exceptions to lack of standing-
based dismissal involved a ruling issued so close to Democratic Underground so as not to have been 
aware of or considered the SAA, or ruled on secondary motions or unrelated grounds.  See Democratic 
Underground, 2011 WL 3705060 (denying Righthaven the ability to intervene in the countersuit against 
Stephen’s Media for inability to show that Righthaven would represent Stephens Media’s interest); 
Righthaven LLC v. Choudhry, 2:10-CV-2155 JCM (PAL), 2011 WL 2976800 (D. Nev. July 21, 2011) 
(reconsidering previous holdings on inline copying and volition); Righthaven LLC v. Va. Citizens Def. 
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procedural hurdle, but these efforts failed to reverse the course on any of the open 
proceedings.101 
Even where the Ninth Circuit jurisdictional precedent was not binding, other 
courts found Righthaven lacked standing to pursue an infringement claim.  Rather 
than simply apply the Silvers test, however, the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Colorado developed yet another interpretation of standing that brought further 
uncertainty to an already muddied terrain.  In Righthaven LLC v. Wolf, Righthaven 
sued Leland Wolf, blogger and owner of the It Makes Sense Blog, for reposting a 
photograph originally published in the Denver Post.102  The Wolf court recognized 
that the decision in Silvers was perhaps “persuasive authority” but not binding 
precedent on the Tenth Circuit; as such, it provided its own analysis of the 
copyright statute.103  The court readily admitted the “divisibility” of copyright 
made explicit by the 1976 Act but found divisibility was not without limits:  “the 
free assignment of the right to sue for infringement, as permitted by the Fifth 
Circuit in Prather and advocated by Judge Bea in his dissent in Silvers, skews the 
delicate balance that underlies federal copyright law.”104  Like the holding in 
Silvers, the court found that one assigned a “bare right to sue for infringement has 
no interest in the legal dissemination of the copyrighted material.”105  The court 
recognized the policy implications of this interpretation:  a party that only gains 
benefit from bringing infringement claims “necessarily limits public access to the 
copyrighted work.”106 
However, the Wolf court found the Silvers court’s interpretation of section 
501(b) to be lacking as well.  Rather than focus solely on the scope of the word 
“exclusive,” the Wolf court looked to the two categories of owners entitled to bring 
an infringement suit:  legal owners and beneficial owners.107  Legal owners were 
defined as in Silvers, limited to those holding an exclusive right as per section 106.  
But beneficial owners, described as “parties who stand to benefit from the legal 
dissemination of copyrighted material,” the court noted, have standing to sue as 
well.108 
According to the court, Righthaven possessed neither a legal nor beneficial 
 
League, Inc., 2:10-CV-01683-GMN, 2011 WL 2550627 (D. Nev. June 23, 2011) (denying the motion to 
dismiss in absence of SAA discussion). 
 101. See, e.g., Mostofi, 2011 WL 2746315, at *3 (“Here, Plaintiff and Stephens Media attempt to 
impermissibly amend the facts to manufacture standing.  Therefore, the Court shall not consider the 
amended language of the SAA, but the actual assignment and language of the SAA as it existed at the 
time the complaint was filed.”); Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1147 (“Even assuming that the May 9, 2011 
Clarification can change the jurisdictional facts as they existed at the time of the filing of the suit, it still 
does not correct the deficiencies with respect to lack of standing.”).  
 102. 813 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1267 (D. Colo. 2011).  For Righthaven’s relationship with the Denver 
Post, see supra note 52.  
 103. 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1269. 
 104. Id. at 1270. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 1271–72. 
 108. Id. at 1272. 
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interest in the allegedly infringed photograph.109  The legal interest remained with 
Media News Group (owner of the Denver Post) as it had retained exploitative 
rights in and to the copyrighted works.  Righthaven’s sole economic interest in 
bringing suit for infringement was held not to be a beneficial interest, either.110  
The court offered no discussion or rationale for its denial of a beneficial interest, 
but the divergence from both the Silvers court and one of its dissenting opinions is 
quite clear: even an exception to the standing rule for original creators of a 
copyrighted work, as argued for by the dissenting Judge Berzon in Silvers, would 
be of little use to a nonauthoring entity such as Righthaven.111 
4.  The End of Righthaven 
Righthaven brought its final case in court on May 6, 2011—prior to the 
Democratic Underground ruling—but its eventual downfall came several months 
later as courts began not only to dismiss suits it had brought but also to levy 
penalties against the company.112  In Democratic Underground, the court suggested 
that Righthaven’s initial failure to disclose the SAA, and the underlying pecuniary 
interest that Stephens Media continued to hold in the infringement actions pursued 
by Righthaven, might constitute a “flagrant misrepresentation” subject to court 
sanctions.113  Two courts considered the issue more thoroughly but declined to 
award attorney’s fees to defendants.114  Other courts, however, granted attorney’s 
fees ranging from a modest $3,815,115 to over $100,000,116 and in one case 
imposed a fine of $5,000 for misleading the court.117  Unwilling to go down 
 
 109. Id. at 1273. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 891–92, 894 (9th Cir. 2005) (Berzon, J., 
dissenting) (“Contrary to the majority’s strict statutory approach, the question of valid assignment “is 
appropriate for the development of interstitial federal common law [to ensure] harmony with the overall 
purposes of the [Copyright Act] . . . Silvers, as the creator, is the person for whom the copyright system 
is designed to provide incentives for more creations.”). 
 112. Complaint, Righthaven LLC v. Bob Sieber, No. 11-00729 (D. Nev. May 6, 2011).  The only 
complaint filed subsequent to Bob Sieber was an amended complaint to Righthaven LLC v. Dean 
Mostofi, Case No. 11-cv-01160 (D. Nev. July 13, 2011).  See RIGHTHAVEN LAWSUITS, supra note 53. 
 113. Righthaven, LLC v. Democratic Underground, LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d, 968, 978–79; see also 
David Kravets, Nevada Judge Threatens Sanctions for Copyright Troll, WIRED (Jun. 14, 2011, 6:43 
PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/06/copyright-troll-sanctions/. 
 114. Righthaven LLC v. Hill, 1:11-CV-00211-JLK, 2011 WL 4018105, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 9, 
2011); Righthaven, LLC v. Leon, 2:10-CV-01672-GMN, 2011 WL 2693538, at *1 (D. Nev. July 11, 
2011). 
 115. See Righthaven, LLC v. Leon, 2:10-CV-01672-GMN, 2011 WL 2633118, at *2 (D. Nev. July 
5, 2011). 
 116. Righthaven LLC v. DiBiase, 2:10-CV-01343-RLH, 2011 WL 5101938, at *1 (D. Nev. Oct. 
26, 2011) (awarding attorney’s fees of $116,718 on Ninth Circuit precedent that a defendant can recover 
attorney’s fees where case dismissed for plaintiff’s lack of standing from not owning the copyright at 
issue (citing Maljack Productions v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 889 (9th Cir. 1996))). 
 117. See Steve Green, Judge:  Righthaven Masquerading as a Company, VEGAS INC (Jul. 14, 
2011, 10:18 AM), http://www.vegasinc.com/news/2011/jul/14/judge-fines-righthaven-5000-misleading-
court-over-/ (noting fine of Righthaven attorney Shawn Mangano for not disclosing that Stephens Media 
shares in Righthaven lawsuit recovery amounts). 
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without a fight, Righthaven initially filed a number of appeals.118  But the mounting 
cost of imposed legal fees and sanctions left Righthaven in disarray; it missed key 
filing deadlines in several of its appeals cases and had its remaining assets seized 
by court marshals.119  In a fitting end for an entity that once sought to seize the 
websites of alleged infringers, Righthaven sold its own website at auction in early 
2012 for a mere $3,300.120 
III.  BEYOND RIGHTHAVEN:  MORE PROBLEMS THAN ANSWERS 
With its rapid ascendancy and abrupt demise, Righthaven in one sense is little 
more than a failed experiment by a newspaper publisher to take a stand against 
competing news sources on the Internet and attempt to raise revenues through 
statutory damages campaigns.  More broadly, though, the impact of the Righthaven 
decisions goes beyond the elimination of a single troll, and carries implications for 
the future of copyright protection on the Internet. 
The Ninth Circuit precedent of Silvers made it difficult to maintain a cause of 
action absent possession of one of section 106’s specified exclusive rights.  The 
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado’s explication of beneficial owners 
in Wolf, for its part, took a broader conception of which right holders could bring 
copyright infringement cases.  It nevertheless stopped short of endorsing troll-like 
entities such as Righthaven that benefited only from large statutory infringement 
remedies and not from the legal dissemination of copyrighted material from more 
proportionate licensing fees.  And in keeping with the initial wave of harsh 
criticism Righthaven faced when it began its enforcement campaign, open-Internet 
supporters took great satisfaction in its downfall.121 
But much like the billy goats that were too fat to return home after their victory 
over the bridge troll, the websites, bloggers and free-Internet foundations that easily 
disposed of Righthaven may have won the battle at a significant cost.  This section 
highlights three key issues for which the Righthaven cases provided a rare 
opportunity for substantive clarification, but instead either compounded the 
 
 118. See Steve Green, Righthaven Offers New Argument in Bid to Revive Lawsuit, VEGAS INC 
(Nov. 30, 2011, 1:12 PM) [hereinafter Green, Righthaven Offers New Argument], 
http://www.vegasinc.com/news/2011/nov/30/righthaven-offers-new-argument-bid-revive-lawsuit/.  
 119. Mike Masnick, Righthaven Loses Track of Its Many Cases; Discovers Four Days Late that It 
Missed Deadline in Appeal, TECHDIRT (Nov. 1, 2011, 3:16 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/ 
20111101/02044916578/righthaven-loses-track-its-many-cases-discovers-four-days-late-that-it-missed-
deadline-appeal.shtml.  For missed deadlines, see Steve Green, Righthaven Misses Deadlines, Again 
Faces Asset Seizure Threat, VEGAS INC (Oct. 29, 2011, 11:36 AM), http://www.vegasinc.com/news/ 
2011/oct/29/righthaven-misses-deadlines-again-faces-asset-seiz/.  For seizure of assets, see Steve Green, 
Marshals Execute Against Righthaven Bank Account, VEGAS INC (Nov. 10, 2011, 8:23 PM), 
http://www.vegasinc.com/news/2011/nov/10/marshals-execute-against-righthaven-bank-account/. 
 120. See Juston Massoud, Righthaven Website Sells for a Measly $3,300, MYCE (Jan. 7, 2010, 
1:00 PM), http://www.myce.com/news/righthaven-website-sells-for-a-measly-3300-56893/.  
 121. See, e.g., Donald Douglas, Beating Righthaven, AM. POWER (Nov. 3, 2011, 7:00 AM), 
http://americanpowerblog.blogspot.com/2011/11/beating-righthaven.html; Righthaven, Buh-buy, TEA 
PARTY PERRYSBURG (Dec. 24, 2011, 7:48 AM), http://teapartyatperrysburg.blogspot.com/ 
2011/12/righthaven-buh-buy.html (“We’ve commented (carefully) about Righthaven before but no 
comment is quite so on point and satisfying as typing an obituary.”). 
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preexistent uncertainty or left crucial matters unexplored. First, circuits remain 
sharply divided over the qualifications for standing to bring a copyright 
infringement suit, generating legal uncertainty that leaves parties uncertain of their 
ability to enforce their property rights.  Second, the failure of the Righthaven courts 
to rule on the merits of the alleged infringement activities precluded discussion of 
the boundaries of copyright protection on the Internet:  specifically, what can and 
cannot be done with newspaper content by its copyright holders as well as third-
party readers and users.  As those few cases that engaged in substantive analysis of 
the fair use doctrine underscore, it is crucial to build a body of credible case law 
subject to judicial review in order to address an ever-more important arena for 
copyrighted material.  Third, the Righthaven cases compounded the problems of a 
newspaper industry struggling in a new media environment without providing any 
alternative road to protecting a vital public interest.  These significant casualties in 
the emerging debate over copyright trolling signal the importance of engaging 
critically those cases that may have seemingly straightforward legal answers but 
can lead to regrettable outcomes. 
A.  FURTHER DESTABILIZED STANDING FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT SUITS 
Righthaven’s initial plan to represent a wide swath of publications across the 
country may have deepened a circuit split in a number of circuits that have yet to 
address standing requirements in copyright cases.  This might have helped explain 
the limits of the 1976 Act’s promotion of divisibility, the relative benefits of 
protection of legitimate creators and the economic opportunities brought about by 
secondary markets for intellectual property.  The forceful condemnation from the 
post-Democratic Underground decisions, though, burdened Righthaven with 
crippling legal fees and sanctions, preventing it from maintaining any appeals that 
could have raised the standing issue above the district court level.122 
Furthermore, the jurisdictional roadblock placed before Righthaven could prove 
less difficult to overcome for future, analogous copyright enforcement operations.  
As leading trademark litigator Ron Coleman notes, Righthaven “overlawyered” the 
arrangement with media companies and could have simply bought the copyright to 
the stories outright for next to nothing: 
[T]hey were, after all, economically worthless to anyone but Righthaven.  There were 
plenty of ways to send money back to the original copyright holders without the 
complex reversions, reservations and really complicated stuff they ended up having to 
 
 122. On the other hand, Righthaven may never have seriously maintained the standing issue even 
if it had more ample resources to continue its operations.  As the court in Wolf noted, Righthaven 
conceded that the Silvers standard should apply in the District of Colorado, arguing instead that the 
Copyright Assignment Agreement (a later iteration of the initial SSA) should not impact the grant of 
copyright to Righthaven of the accrued cause of action, or in the alternative, that the “license back” 
provision retained by the Denver Post “only vitiates claims for present or future infringement.”  
Righthaven v. Wolf, F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1268 (D. Colo. 2011).  The dire financial straits effectively led to 
the dismantling of Righthaven, therein preventing the defunct entity from mounting any legitimate 
appeal its unfavorable opinions. 
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cough up and which got all those judges in Nevada so sore.123 
In effect, a future copyright troll could better replicate the patent troll formula to 
reach a pre-Democratic Underground state in which the relative merits of each case 
of alleged infringement would be considered, generating enough uncertainty to 
induce early settlement.  By Coleman’s logic, standing does little to disrupt the 
financial incentives of copyright enforcement in the shadow of potential litigation.  
For example, there is some indication that, at least in international circles, 
newspaper-based copyright holders are willing to pursue Righthaven-like 
infringement claims where there is no question of standing.124 
What remains to be seen, however, is whether U.S.-based newspaper companies 
would be willing to test the waters of copyright enforcement so thoroughly sullied 
by Righthaven.  Now that there exist three judicial tests of standing post-
Righthaven, each possessing its own problems (i.e., critical rejection of the Ninth 
Circuit’s Silvers test, vague contours of the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Colorado’s Wolf test and the outdated statutory scheme of the Fifth Circuit’s 
Prather test), is it really as clear how to transfer necessary exclusive copyrights to a 
future Righthaven to achieve standing while still funneling money back to the 
newspaper company as Coleman suggests?  Is news content so “economically 
worthless” to newsmakers for them to freely assign exclusive rights to third-party 
enforcers?  As new distribution mechanisms continue to emerge from evolving 
technology, it seems too risky for publishers to forgo enough rights to meet an ill-
defined standing threshold. 
For their part, the Righthaven cases prevented such exploration before it had a 
chance to begin.  Arguably the best approach to avoid standing hurdles would be 
for news companies to create in-house copyright enforcement departments.  
However, the significant investment of time and resources to execute such a 
program would require more certainty as to what kind of claims might be worth 
pursuing.  Righthaven’s dismissals on jurisdictional grounds precluded most 
considerations of the permissible uses of newspaper content on the Internet.  And 
as discussed below, in those few instances in which the courts engaged in 
substantive analysis, the parameters of fair use remain barely comprehensible. 
B.  ADDED CONFUSION TO FAIR USE ON THE INTERNET 
As noted above, Righthaven’s efforts to enforce newspaper copyrights did not 
encompass all forms of unauthorized use but focused exclusively on Internet-based 
appropriation.  The Internet allows for a diffuse and pervasive dissemination of 
 
 123. Ron Coleman, What “Beating Righthaven” Means, LIKELIHOOD CONFUSION (Nov. 3, 2011), 
http://www.likelihoodofconfusion.com/what-beating-righthaven-means/. 
 124. See, e.g., Jitesh Pillai, Yahoo Slammed with Copyright Infringement Lawsuit by Singapore’s 
Media Company, EBRANDZ (Nov. 28, 2011, 12:11 AM), http://news.ebrandz.com/yahoo/2011/4962-
yahoo-slammed-with-copyright-infringement-lawsuit-by-singapores-media-company-.html (“Asian 
media group Singapore Press Holdings, which holds a near monopoly of newspaper publishing in the 
city-state, last Wednesday said it is suing Yahoo! for copyright infringement, accusing the US Internet 
giant of reproducing content from its stable of newspapers without obtaining permission.”). 
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creative content, making easy targets for Righthaven suits that would have been 
much harder to track down in nondigital instances of unauthorized use.125  Prior 
cases engaging questions of fair use generally involved indexical copying by Web-
aggregators and search engines.126  The Righthaven cases, by contrast, offered a 
rare opportunity to examine the parameters of fair use on the Internet involving the 
appropriation of copyrighted work by individuals whose own website entries and 
blog postings may warrant copyright protection.127  In particular, three of the 
Righthaven cases raise an array of important issues for news content on the 
Internet.128 
1.  Righthaven v. Realty One 
In May of 2010, Michael Nelson posted an excerpt from an LVR-J article 
entitled, “Program may level housing sale odds” on his website covering home 
 
 125. Randy Kennedy, Apropos Appropriation, N.Y. TIMES, January 1, 2012, at AR8 (“[T]oday’s 
flow of creative expression, riding a tide of billions of instantly accessible digital images and clips, is 
rapidly becoming so free and recycling so reflexive that it is hard to imagine it being slowed, much less 
stanched, whatever happens in court.”). 
 126. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding search 
engine “operator’s display of thumbnail images of copyright owner’s photographs was fair use”); Kelly 
v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding search engine operator’s use of 
thumbnails was a fair use); Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1118 (D. Nev. 2006) (finding 
Web-cache of author’s copyrighted short story was protected by fair use); Ticketmaster Corp. v. 
Tickets.com, Inc., CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL 21406289, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003) (linking 
to a third-party website protected by fair use); Keiyana Fordham, Can Newspapers Be Saved?  How 
Copyright Law Can Save Newspapers from the Challenges of New Media, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 939, 942 (2010); Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797 
(2010); Brian Link, Drawing a Line in Alternate Universes:  Exposing the Inadequacies of the Current 
Four-Factor Fair Use Test Through Chanslash, 33 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 139, 142 (2010) (“In order to 
provide authors of copyrighted “literary works” a more equal footing when combating infringers in the 
Internet age, this Note suggests that courts take into consideration a fifth “moral rights” factor when 
determining infringement under the fair use doctrine.”); Sean O’Reilly, Nominative Fair Use and 
Internet Aggregators:  Copyright and Trademark Challenges Posed by Bots, Web Crawlers and Screen-
Scraping Technologies, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 273 (2007).  
 127. One of the few previous such cases involved the inverse of what occurred with Righthaven.  
In Religious Technology Center v. Lerma, the court found the Washington Post’s excerpting of content 
posted on the Church of Scientology website in its newspaper to be protected by fair use.  908 F. Supp. 
1353, 1358 (E.D. Va. 1995).  However, in Religious Technology Center v. Lerma, the Church of 
Scientology found vindication where the reposting of complete works by the church on third-party 
websites was held to be beyond any fair use exemption from infringement.  CIV.A No. 95-1107-A, 1996 
WL 633131, at *1 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 1996); see also Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 
791, 800 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding the reprinting of building codes on a third-party website to not 
constitute copyright infringement as municipal law was not copyrightable); Lenz v. Universal Music 
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (requiring copyright holders to consider fair use 
exemption before issuing a DMCA takedown notice); Joseph M. Miller, Fair Use Through the Lenz of § 
512(c) of the DMCA:  A Preemptive Defense to a Premature Remedy?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1697, 1711 
(2010).  
 128. The only other decision that includes substantial discussion of a fair use defense, Righthaven 
LLC v. Choudhry, held enough issues of material fact present to decline a grant of summary judgment in 
either direction on the fair use question.  2:10-CV-2155 JCM PAL, 2011 WL 1743839, at *5 (D. Nev. 
May 3, 2011). 
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ownership in the Las Vegas area.129  Righthaven brought suit for infringement for 
unauthorized publication of portions of the copyrighted article; Nelson contended 
that he had a fair use defense.  In its four-factor fair use analysis, the court found 
the purpose and character of the use—“to create business for [Defendant Nelson] as 
a duly licensed realtor operating in that market”—to disfavor fair use, whereas the 
other factors pointed in the opposite direction:  the portion excerpted contained 
“factual news reporting” rather than “reporter commentary”; the use involved only 
“the first eight sentences of a thirty sentence article”; and, the lack of any 
commentary in the excerpted passage “does not satisfy a reader’s desire to view 
and read the article in its entirety . . . and thereby does not dilute the market for the 
copyrighted work.”130  Here, the court addressed the complex commercial nature of 
Web-based content, in which the display of “free” information may not belie an 
underlying commercial opportunity. 
Moreover, the copyrighted work under discussion leaned more toward factual 
information than creative expression, suggesting that actions to enforce newspaper 
copyrights generally, rather than the particular bad faith tactics of a troll such as 
Righthaven, make a fair use argument particularly compelling.  Perhaps this signals 
a motivating force in the Righthaven cases that distinguishes Righthaven from a 
licensing organization such as ASCAP not in terms of the actors, but the type of 
content that each seeks to protect under copyright.  The fair use analysis thus opens 
up an opportunity for public policy considerations that look beyond the alleged act 
of infringement to the foundational concern with the nature and purpose of 
copyright protection, a discussion that may have blossomed either in the court room 
or in the critical literature if the Righthaven cases had had an opportunity to 
develop a substantial body of case law. 
2.  Righthaven v. JAMA 
In JAMA, a nonprofit committed to “a multi-racial, multicultural movement for 
immigrant and refugee rights” posted a copyright-protected LVR-J article on its 
website.131  Unlike the use of an excerpt in Realty One, the alleged infringement 
here involved the use of an entire LVR-J article.  Additionally, the alleged 
infringing website was more strictly not-for-profit than the arguably commercial 
impetus behind Nelson’s “information blog” in Realty One.  As in most fair use 
analyses, it is difficult if not impossible to discern which factor (if any) determines 
the outcome, but the court in JAMA reached the same finding—i.e., that the alleged 
infringement constituted fair use—as did the court in Realty One.132 The court’s 
reasoning on the issue of transformation is of particular interest: 
[Defendant’s] use of the article is transformative.  Although the former owner, the 
 
 129. Righthaven LLC v. Realty One Group, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-1036-LRH-PAL, 2010 WL 
4115413, at *1 (D. Nev. Oct. 19, 2010).   
 130. Id. at *2. 
 131. Righthaven, LLC v. JAMA, No. 2:10-CV-1322 JCM (LRL), 2011 WL 1541613, at *1 (D. 
Nev. 2011).   
 132. Id. at *5. 
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LVR-J, used the article for news reporting, the court focuses on the current copyright 
owner’s use, which, at this juncture, has been shown to be nothing more than 
litigation-driven.  Accordingly, [Defendant’s] use of the article to educate the public 
is transformative and does not constitute a substitution of the plaintiff’s use.133 
Similarly, by emphasizing that “Righthaven cannot claim the LVR-J’s market as its 
own and is not operating as a traditional newspaper,” again a court looks to the 
plaintiff bringing suit, and not the use itself, in conducting a fair use analysis.134  
Usually, the determination of transformation involves examination of the actual use 
and whether it weighs for or against a finding of fair use.135  Here, however, the 
court seemed to suggest that the plaintiff’s use—rather than whatever potential 
transformation the defendant made—should determine this factor of fair use 
analysis.136  This may be understandable from one sense of policy perspective; after 
all, JAMA is a nonprofit organization that provides assistance to minority 
immigrants and refugees, whereas Righthaven’s stake in the case is limited to 
litigation-driven profits.  But an analysis that looks at the plaintiff bringing suit 
rather than the use in question moves away from the generally accepted notion of 
“use” in fair use analysis and toward a legal analysis divorced from the actual 
works that copyright aims to cover. 
3.  Righthaven v. Hoehn 
In November 2010, Wayne Hoehn posted an LVR-J article entitled, Public 
Employee Pensions.  We Can’t Afford Them, on the sports-betting website 
madjacksports.com.137  Hoehn had never been employed by Mad Jack Sports but 
rather posted the article in the public comment section of the website.138  As was 
the case in JAMA, Hoehn reprinted an entire copyright protected LVR-J article, but 
the court nevertheless found his use to be protected.139  The court placed special 
emphasis on the noncommercial purpose and character of the use, as Hoehn posted 
the article “to foster discussion in a specific interactive website forum . . . 
consistent with comment, for which 17 U.S.C. § 107 provides fair use 
protection.”140  Such a broad understanding of “comment” opens up the possibility 
of fair use exemptions for nearly all blog-based activity, for what blog could not be 
described as a “comment”?  Furthermore, the court’s analysis of the nature of the 
work significantly curtails the scope of copyright protection for newspaper-based 
content.  Despite acknowledging that the article in question was an original 
 
 133. Id. at *2. 
 134. Id. at *5.  
 135. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (internal citations omitted) 
(“The central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice Story’s words, whether the new work 
merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further 
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message . . . .”). 
 136. JAMA, 2011 WL 1541613, at *5. 
 137. Righthaven, LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1141 (D. Nev. 2011). 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 1149.  
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editorial published by the LVR-J, a piece more closely associated with creative 
commentary than the reportage of Realty One and JAMA, the court broke down the 
editorial into its component paragraphs to find that the creative elements “are not 
enough to consider the Work a ‘purely creative work.’”141 
This line of reasoning adds little to fair use analysis.  It is a well established 
copyright principle that only content that meets the creative requirements of 
copyright warrants copyright protection, and those portions that are merely factual 
do not gain access to said protections.142  In other words, to find that a work is not 
“purely creative” does not preclude some amount of copyright protection (insofar 
as the “creative elements” are concerned).143  The nature of a given work is not so 
black and white, and where the entire copyrighted work has been reproduced, it 
seems illogical to hold that the nature of a work containing creative elements so 
clearly favors a finding of fair use.  A newspaper editorial may be distinct from a 
piece of narrative fiction or song lyrics, but such an absolutist conception of 
creativity leaves little room for newspapers to protect valid copyrights, on the 
Internet or elsewhere. 
* * * 
These few cases that engaged in a substantive fair use analysis reveal the 
promise of a fuller substantive engagement that never came to fruition.  Each court 
reached its conclusions on different, and in some cases nontraditional grounds, 
adding just enough material to an already hotly contested doctrine to do more harm 
than good.  That the court in Hoehn felt compelled to conduct a four-factor test in 
what essentially amounts to dicta reflects the willingness of courts to engage the 
difficult questions, if only Righthaven could have survived long enough to 
respond.144  Before its financial woes prevented any of its appeals from going 
forward, Righthaven indicated a desire to weigh in on these fair use analyses.  
While mounting an appeal to the wholesale copying in cases such as JAMA and 
Hoehn, Righthaven conceded that a partial excerpting of a news article by a third-
party blogger amounted to a fair use.145  Absent any categorical judicial holding on 
 
 141. Id.  
 142. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1991) (internal 
citation omitted) (“[F]acts are not copyrightable; the other, that compilations of facts generally are.  
Each of these propositions possesses an impeccable pedigree.  That there can be no valid copyright in 
facts is universally understood.  The most fundamental axiom of copyright law is that ‘[n]o author may 
copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates.’”). 
 143. Id. at 348 (internal citation omitted) (“Originality remains the sine qua non of copyright; 
accordingly, copyright protection may extend only to those components of a work that are original to the 
author.  Thus, if the compilation author clothes facts with an original collocation of words, he or she 
may be able to claim a copyright in this written expression.”).  
 144. Righthaven opposed summary judgment proceedings given the early stage of the litigation, 
but the court nevertheless held that Righthaven had shown no reason to conduct discovery in opposition 
to summary judgment.  See Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1148.   
 145. Sheri Qualters, Righthaven Affiliate Concedes that Brief Web Excerpt Is Fair Use, NAT’L L. J. 
(Nov. 23, 2011), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1321804570307& 
Righthaven_Affiliate_Concedes_That_Brief_Web_Excerpt_is_Fair_Use (“The latest chapter in the 
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the issue, it is difficult to discern whether Righthaven felt that this was the correct 
interpretation of fair use or just whether it had little choice but to abandon its 
weaker (if still potentially winnable) cases in order to survive, in light of the 
jurisdictional difficulties and mounting sanctions.  Partial excerption arguably falls 
closer to fair use than wholesale reproduction, but the curtailed Righthaven cases 
never had a chance to define where the ultimate dividing line should fall.146 
From this perspective, the limited and questionable interpretation of the fair use 
doctrine might demonstrate the greatest lost opportunity from the short-lived 
Righthaven cases.  Righthaven brought 276 individual infringement cases, each 
with a distinct set of factual circumstances along each of the fair use factors.  If 
even a tenth of these cases reached a judicial determination on the merits rather 
than merely jurisdictional grounds, a significant amount of crucial common law on 
the issue could have emerged.  Even as Righthaven entered its death throes, 
nonnewspaper media entities recognized the importance of developing doctrine in 
this arena, with the RIAA hinting at filing a brief in support of Righthaven.147  
Particularly for the Internet, where more information is made available for a wider 
range of uses than ever before, the lack of clear indicators of what use is fair 
provides little guidance to both future content users and copyright enforcers.148 
C.  NEW CHALLENGES FOR STRUGGLING NEWS MEDIA 
Given Righthaven’s unsavory practices and the sympathetic defendants against 
which it brought suit in its enforcement campaign, it is easy to forget that the 
clients whom the “troll” hopes to represent are not untouchable media tycoons of a 
Hearstian era but overseers of a dying newspaper industry.  There is a great deal of 
discussion over whether the cause of newspaper decline can be attributed to the 
 
Nevada federal court saga launched by aggressive copyright plaintiff Righthaven LLC is a concession 
by its affiliate, Las Vegas Review-Journal publisher Stephens Media, that a brief news article excerpt in 
an online forum is not copyright infringement.”). 
 146. For example, Righthaven’s contention that reputational benefits from blogging might 
undermine Hoehn’s finding that the activity is noncommercial never had a chance to get off the ground.  
See Green, Righthaven Offers New Argument, supra note 118 (“They can profit without paying any 
price, Righthaven says, by lifting stories from newspaper websites to enhance their own standing in the 
online world.”). 
 147. Steve Green, Book, Record Industries Attack Righthaven Fair Use Ruling, VEGAS INC. (Dec. 
5, 2011, 9:26 PM), http://www.vegasinc.com/news/2011/dec/05/book-record-industries-attack-
righthaven-fair-use-/ (“If Righthaven can’t somehow revive its standing to sue over newspaper content 
copyright violations, it won’t be filing new lawsuits and there won’t be any more fair use controversies 
to be resolved.”); Mike Masnick, RIAA Really Planning To Join Righthaven Fight, TECHDIRT (Dec. 5, 
2011, 9:59 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111205/05001716972/riaa-really-planning-to-join-
righthaven-fight.shtml (“RIAA and the Association of American Publishers (AAP) is planning to try to 
join the [Hoehn] case, arguing that the issue of standing (i.e., the fact that Righthaven doesn’t have the 
copyrights in question) should preclude the court from even considering the fair use question.”). 
 148. But see David L. Amkraut, The Seven Deadly Myths of Internet Copyright, WEBNET77, 
http://webnet77.com/webstuff/copyright.htmlhttp://webnet77.com/webstuff/copyright.html (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2012); contra CHRISTOPHER ALAN JENNINGS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FAIR USE ON THE 
INTERNET (2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31423.pdf (“[I]t appears that the new digital 
environment has not caused the courts to abandon or significantly deviate from traditional fair use 
analysis.  Courts appear to be applying the fair use factors in a technologically neutral manner.”). 
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Internet alone or if other factors are in play.149  There is little question, however, 
that newspapers are going out of business or losing considerable readership in an 
era where more and more content is available online, free of charge.  As the LVR-J 
manifesto made clear, frustrated and helpless newspapers felt that they had little 
choice but to explore all potential revenue streams, even if it meant creating an 
outside legal enforcement agent and going after relatively innocuous blog posters. 
Whereas the particular form of copyright trolling taken up by Righthaven was 
resoundingly denounced, the case law provides few answers as to what alternative 
mechanisms of copyright enforcement on the Internet will strike a balance between 
protection and profits.  In February 2011, newswire service the Associated Press 
announced the establishment of News Licensing Group, a clearinghouse for 
newspaper content in the mold of ASCAP.150  It remains to be seen if such a 
project, launched in January 2012, will convince Internet posters to pay for 
information they have long used for free.151  Even with a licensing mechanism in 
place, as in the United Kingdom, legal disputes over what constitutes a use that 
requires a license remain an open and highly contested issue.152  Alternatively, one 
former Righthaven client under new leadership finds promise for thriving 
newspapers in a free, more open Internet.153  Whether such a utopian vision will 
win over skeptics while statutory damages are still on the table remains to be seen. 
Finally, the Righthaven cases may signal a lost opportunity to explore a separate 
form of protection for the newspaper industry:  the hot news doctrine.154  Given the 
 
 149. See, e.g., Jeff Jarvis, Is the Internet Killing the Newspaper?, BIG THINK (May 8, 2008), 
http://bigthink.com/ideas/1263; Peter Preston, We Thought the Internet Was Killing Print.  But It Isn’t, 
OBSERVER (Oct. 16, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/oct/17/newspaper-abcs-websites-
internet-news; Who Killed the Newspaper?, ECONOMIST (Aug. 24, 2006), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/7830218. 
 150. Russell Adams, AP to Launch News Licensing Group, WSJ DIGITS (Feb. 3, 2011, 4:48 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/02/03/ap-to-launch-news-licensing-group/.  
 151. Rick Edmonds, AP, 28 News Orgs Launch NewsRight to Collect Licensing Fees from 
Aggregators, POYNTER (Jan. 5, 2012, 3:24 PM), http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/business-news/the-
biz-blog/157817/ap-28-news-orgs-launch-newsright-to-collect-licensing-fees-from-aggregators/. 
 152. See, e.g., Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd. v. Meltwater Holding BV, [2011] EWCA Civ 
890 (U.K.), available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/media/judgments/2011/newspaper-licensing-
agency-ltd-others-v-meltwater-holding-bv-others (holding headlines may benefit from copyright 
protection as a “free-standing original literary work”); Shireen Smith, Linking and Copyright following 
Meltwater v. Newspaper Licensing Agency, AZRIGHTS (Mar. 14, 2011), http://ip-
brands.com/blog/2011/03/linking-and-copyright-following-meltwater-v-newspaper-licensing-agency/. 
 153. John Paxton, WAN IFRA International Newsroom Summit:  How the Crowd Saved Our 
Company, DIGITAL FIRST (Jun 8, 2011, 3:32 PM), https://jxpaton.wordpress.com/2011/06/08/wan_ifra/ 
(“Instead of pay walls, we see greater value creation in the open sharing of our content.  Our approach is 
to treat content like an API – available to any who want it” (quoted in Rainey Reitman & Kurt Opsahl, 
From the Ashes of Righthaven, the Promising Future of Digital Media, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. 
(Sept. 12, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/09/ashes-righthaven-promising-future-digital-
media)).  
 154. See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); Barclays Capital Inc. v. 
Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011); Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 
F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997); Lauren M. Gregory, Comment, Hot off the Presses:  How Traditional 
Newspaper Journalism Can Help Reinvent the “Hot News” Misappropriation Tort in the Internet Age, 
13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 577 (2011); Amy E. Jensen, Comment, When News Doesn’t Want to Be 
Free:  Rethinking “Hot News” to Help Counter Free Riding on Newspaper Content Online, 60 EMORY 
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significant controversy generated by the trolling, perhaps Righthaven-like 
companies could pursue similar protection of news content such as the hot news 
doctrine without relying upon copyright, long an uneasy bedfellow for information 
heavy (as opposed to original and creative) news content.155 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Copyright trolling in the model of Righthaven is but the latest in a long line of 
enforcement schemes designed to extract value from intellectual property by any 
means necessary.  The combination of staggering statutory damages, exorbitant 
litigation costs, and the ease with which parties can track unauthorized uses often 
proves too enticing an option for faltering industries hoping to survive in an 
uncertain technological future. 
The Righthaven cases unquestionably destroyed Righthaven, removing one 
individual troll from the copyright enforcement business.  Less certain are the 
prospects of future enforcement mechanisms for copyright holders seeking to 
emulate the patent trolls and of the businesses that rely on the profitability of their 
intellectual property to survive.  Copyright trolling behavior continues to 
proliferate, and newspaper companies continue to falter. 
Crucially, it is difficult to find any resolution to the question of standing for 
copyright infringement claims.  The U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada 
applied existing precedent developed in Silvers, a test that has been met with much 
critical opposition.  The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado in Wolf 
established yet another criterion for evaluating standing without developing its 
rationale, particularly with respect to beneficial ownership.  Moreover, the Wolf 
court left unresolved whether the less restrictive interpretation of the Fifth Circuit 
in Prather, while decided under the 1909 Act, might nevertheless better comport 
with the 1976 Act’s more expansive consideration of divisibility and alienability to 
protect authors and provide financial opportunities to copyright holders.  Without 
any funds to contest even the Colorado court’s Wolf decision, Righthaven could not 
obtain appellate review, which might have brought some much needed court 
analysis to this underdeveloped area of the law.  Whether the SAA between 
Stephens Media and Righthaven was simply “over-lawyered” or whether there 
existed a more fundamental deficiency in this type of arrangement remains an open 
question.  Going forward, newspapers can know neither what options will meet 
 
L.J. 537 (2010); Daniel S. Park, Comment, The Associated Press v. All Headline News:  How Hot News 
Misappropriation Will Shape the Unsettled Customary Practices of Online Journalism, 25 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 369 (2010); Eric P. Schmidt, Comment, Hot News Misappropriation in the Internet Age, 9 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 313 (2011). 
 155. Recent court developments, particularly in the Second Circuit’s ruling in 
Theflyonthewall.com, suggest that the hot news doctrine is an increasingly difficult protection to 
maintain and that it might have been of little assistance to Righthaven.  Furthermore, an NBA v. 
Motorola preemption analysis would likely have found copyright to be the governing law in this 
instance.  On the other hand, the sister court ruling would of course not have been binding on the 
Righthaven cases, nor would a newspaper company face some of the public perception difficulties that 
an investment bank seeking to hide market data from the generally public had to face.   
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jurisdictional requirements nor what potentially valuable rights they must give up 
in the process. 
Even if newspaper companies were in a financial position to avoid jurisdictional 
problems altogether by creating in-house copyright enforcement mechanisms, the 
continued uncertainty regarding the substantive viability of Righthaven-like claims 
makes such investments highly unlikely.  In particular, the Righthaven decisions 
did not limit reprobation to the question of standing, but they also added further 
confusion to the notoriously murky realm of fair use analysis.  Especially where the 
lack of standing precluded the suit from moving forward, courts engaged in less-
than-thorough fair use analyses which at times lacked even internal coherence.  
One might dismiss these discussions as mere dicta, but the general scarcity of case 
law on analogous Internet uses may give these opinions more legitimacy and 
authority than they deserve, all the while failing to articulate guidelines as to what 
is and is not likely to be held a fair use. 
Newspaper companies, then, are left with little direction in how to move 
forward.  There exist preliminary efforts to enact alternative compulsory licensing 
mechanisms, but foreign-based developments suggest that even this form of 
copyright protection carries with it legal complications.  Meanwhile, the once 
viable hot news doctrine continues to erode, further curtailing the ability of 
newspapers to survive intrusions upon its content on the Internet. 
There may, however, be one silver lining to the Righthaven cases beyond simply 
getting rid of Righthaven.  For all of the questions about standing, fair use and the 
fate of newspapers left unresolved by the Righthaven cases, the swift condemnation 
of trolling in the copyright arena perhaps signals an alternative approach to the tacit 
acceptance of said practices in the patent arena.  Copyright trolls are barred from 
the gates of copyright enforcement, while other forms of rights divisibility remain 
acceptable, perhaps reflecting a relevant critique of how other property systems 
treat value.  What both patent trolls and copyright license mechanisms such as 
ASCAP share—and what Righthaven and other copyright trolls lack—is potential 
value generated by the use, rather than mere exchange, of intellectual property.  
More than any bad faith behavior or poor legal structuring, Righthaven’s fatal flaw 
may simply have been its lack of interest in dissemination of the copyrighted works 
it sought to protect.  From this perspective, perhaps the important standing question 
is not who may sue, but why. 
 
